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HOW LONG UNTIL CRISIS IN AFRICAN WILDLIFE INTEGRATED
CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS (ICDPs)?
SIMULATION RESULTS FROM THE SERENGETI ECOSYSTEM
Christopher B. Barrett and Peter Arcese

ABSTRACT

This paper develops a model coupling species population dynamics with endogenous human
consumption and poaching behavior in an environment of imperfect labor and product markets and
static agricultural production technology subject to environmental shocks. Using the case of the
Serengeti, we then simulate how integrated conservation and development projects (lCDPs) might
effectively serve as a delaying tactic against biodiversity loss until a more durable solution can be
found to the challenge of wildlife conservation lin the midst of endemic rural poverty.

HOW LONG UNTIL CRISIS IN AFRICAN WILDLIFE INTEGRATED
CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS (ICDPs)?
SIMULATION RESULTS FROM THE SERENGETI ECOSYSTEMl

Integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs) have been heavily promoted in
recent years, portrayed as "the vanguard of what will undoubtedly be a broad array of initiatives
attempting to link conservation and development" [5, p. 577]. ICDPs' "aim to achieve their
conservation goals by promoting development and providing local people with alternative income
sources that sustain rather than threaten the flora and fauna in natural habitats" [12, p. 27].
ICDPs involve quasi-contractual arrangements wherein residents of communities on the periphery
of a protected area surrender access to, or curtail illegal offtake of native species and their
habitats in exchange for alternative sources of income and sustenance. We applaud ICDPs'
explicit recognition of the interdependence of human and nonhuman species, but we doubt the
viability of contemporary ICDP designs, which generally proceed from untested biological and
economic assumptions [3].
In many settings, such as the Serengeti, the distribution of game meat from managed
harvests is perhaps proposed as a substantial component of the contractual compensation
J

available to rural residents in an ICDP [11]. This points to a central problem in wildlife ICDPs; at
some time the protected area manager (PAM) will likely will have to choose between breaching
the contract in order to maintain a minimum sustainable herd, or to allow harvesting beyond the

lCorrespondence should be directed to Barrett at Department of Economics, Utah State University, Logan, ur
84322-3530, telephone (801) 797-2306, fax (801) 797-2701, email cbarrett@b202.usu.edu. We thank Ray Hilborn for
making data available and Amit Batabyal, Sandeep Mohapatra, Coty Pinckney, Dawn Thilmany, and participants in
seminars at Utah State University and the 1996 annual meeting of the Allied Social Science Associations for helpful
comments. All remaining errors are ours alone. This research was supported by the Utah Agricultural Experiment
Station and approved as journal paper no. 4870.
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minimum sustainable herd size in order to honor the ICDP contract with the human community,
thereby threatening collapse of the biotic community of interest. This biologically, politically, and
socially perilous decision point is what we mean by "crisis."
In the spirit of constructive criticism, we claim that despite their conceptual appeal,

"ICDPs are not yet analytically or empirically sound approaches ... ICDPs must be regarded as
no more than short-term palliatives in a longer term struggle to refocus attention and resources on
parallel processes of rural development, poverty alleviation and wildlife conservation" [3,
pp. 1080-1]. What appear to be reasonable approaches to incentive-based conservation in the
short run may be of limited long-run effectiveness as long as agricultural production technologies
and market conditions remain static. In this paper we estimate how long ICDPs might effectively
delay biodiversity loss until a more durable solution is found to the challenge of wildlife
conservation in the midst of endemic rural poverty. Alternately put, how long until crisis in
African wildlife ICDPs?

L Background on Wildlife and the Serengeti Regional Economy
The Serengeti ecosystem covers some 25,000 km2 in northern Tanzania and southern
Kenya, a region defined by the wildebeest's migratory range. Tanzania's Serengeti National Park,
initially established in 1929 as a game reserve, now comprises more than half the ecosystem's land
area. It was one of UNESCO's first World Heritage Sites and it is part of one of the world's
largest Biosphere Reserves. The Serengeti contains the world's largest herds of ungulates and
extraordinary biodiversity, including at least 69 species of large mammals and 517 species of

2This section relies extensively on infonnation presented in Sinclair and Areese [16] and Sinclair and
Norton-Griffiths [19].
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birds. The Serengeti lies on the high interior plateau of East Africa, with sharp seasonal patterns
in rainfall and volcanic soils. The spatial and temporal heterogeneity of the environment, which
underly the herbivore migrations that organize the ecosystem, makes the Serengeti one of the
world's most unique and valuable natural resources.
The ecosystem has experienced significant perturbations this century. Ungulate
populations, especially of buffalo and wildebeest, declined dramatically following the introduction
of rinderpest in the 1880s and then grew sharply once rinderpest was eliminated from the region
in the early 1960s. Most recently, there has been rapid growth in human settlements, especially
along the western boundary of the park. Depending on how closely one draws the border around
the park, the human population of the Serengeti region comprises 1-2 million people, and has
been growing at about 3.0% annually, roughly equal to the national 1980-93 average of3 .2%
[23]. This has led to a dramatic increase in the number of poachers. Indeed, Sinclair [15, p. 24]
argues that "the illegal killing of the migrant ungulates by poachers is potentially the most serious
threat to the Serengeti system. Since the migration determines the structure and function of the
system, overharvesting of the migrants with a collapse of their populations will result in the
collapse of the whole system." This paper focuses on this crucial issue of human predation on and
consumption of wildebeest, the Serengeti's keystone species.
The primary reason for wildlife poaching in the Serengeti is endemic poverty. The World
Bank [23] lists Tanzania as the world's poorest nation, with a per capita income ofjust US$90 in
1993 . The economies of the human communities on the periphery of the Serengeti are heavily
agricultural. The World Bank's [22] most recent estimates indicate that 59% of Tanzanian
agriculturalists fall below Tanzania's poverty line ofTSh31,000 (about US$150) annual income
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per capita. Moreover, poverty in the Serengeti region is found to be more widespread and severe
than the national average, with Mara region (on the park's western boundary, where most
poaching occurs) showing per capita income of only TSH 9380 (US$46) in 1991. Food
represents 77% of rural households' expenditures, divided almost evenly between home
production and market purchases. Meat, which comprises only 14% of total food expenditures, is
the least likely food group to be consumed out of own production, and "killing wildlife for meat is
the most serious form of poaching now occurring in the Serengeti" [1, p. 529]. Poaching in the
Serengeti appears to be largely a natural response of poor people teetering on the brink of
nutritional catastrophe.
The Serengeti Regional Conservation Strategy (SRCS) is an ICDP just underway in the
region [11]. Like many African wildlife ICDPs, SRCS aims to improve protected area
management through several channels, of which a primary one is the distribution to villages of
carcass quotas through managed harvests. It is too early to assess the results of SRCS game
cropping, but we offer the simulation below as a suggestive exercise. Our concern is that
"although the legalization of harvesting wildlife outside the park and the setting of quotas for
villages looks reasonable in the short term, there remains the question of whether the harvest can
be controlled within sustainable limits in the long term" [17]. Our basic finding is that as long as
agricultural production technologies and market conditions in the region remain static, ICDPs
with an important game cropping component are unlikely to avert crisis, and may even hasten it.
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IL Modeling Wildebeest Supply and Demand in the Serengeti

ITa. N oncatastrophic Harvest Volumes
The Serengeti is one of the world's most carefully studied ecosystems, and its keystone
species, the wildebeest (Connochaetes taurinus Burchell), is one of the most studied ungulates.
We adopt the most current available population dynamics model, developed by Pascual and
Hilborn (PH) [13], to describe the population dynamics for wildebeest.
Nt+l • [NtS!Sd~ + NtRtleUt -Ht

(1)

Equation (1) details the dynamics of Nt , the number of adult wildebeest in the population at
time t. Population is stochastically related to Sw, the discrete monthly adult survival rate during
the 8 wet season months, Sdt' the discrete monthly adult survival rate during the 4 dry season
months, and ~, the number of individuals added to the adult population per capita (the
"recruitment rate") in time t, which encompasses both pregnancy and calf survival rates.
Following PH, we set Sw=O.99 based on Sinclair [14]. Demographic stochasticity enters through
shocks, llt, which are independent and identically distributed N(O,O.007). Population is reduced
by harvest volume,

~.

Dry season survival and the recruitment rates vary with current environmental conditions.
Recruitment and survival rates are both increasing functions of per capita food availability, Ft,
which is itself an increasing function of both area, A, and monthly grass production, Gt . Gt varies
directly with average monthly dry season rainfall, ~. Equations (2)-(5) capture these
relationships.
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(2)
(3)

Ft - A

Gt

-

(4)

(G",I30)
Nt

(5)

h(NR t )

We follow PH's specification for equations (1 )-( 5) in simulating the available
noncatastrophic harvest volumes. This includes employing Sinclair et al. 's [18] estimates of

'" = 0.98 and 0 = 2.85. The random variables in the model are thus monthly dry season rainfall,
~,

and the demographic stochasticity term, llt;. Furthermore, we employ PH's joint posterior

probability distribution for the Bayesian estimates of a and

P (PHs Table 2) [13].

Thus a,

p, F,

G, NR, Sd, and u all vary over time, creating population dynamics described in detail by PH. We
set a starting value of No at 1.0 million animals, an intermediate number between recent
wildebeest population estimates ranging from 0.9-1.2 million.

Harvest,~,

is determined by

human demand, as detailed in the next section.
The parameterized wildebeest population model thus takes the form3 :

3While we retain PH's MA(4) structure for ~, we use a single scenario, based on mean monthly dry season
rainfall over the 1960-89 period of 149.3 mm. PH use three different scenarios for average new rainfall (lOO, 150, and
200 mmlmonth).
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(6a)
F t - 10

61-3.62.0.23 NR t]
Nt

(6b)
4

NR t

-

149.3.

E "t'Vt-t

(6c)

1-0

" t - iid
'V t

- iid

N(0,0.OO7)
N(0,3600 )

The time path ofN permits estimation of the maximum noncatastrophic harvest volume
each period,

~*,

based on an estimated critical population threshold of250,000, the lowest on

record, just as rinderpest was eliminated. Thus,

*

~ =

Nt - 250000. This provides the supply side

of the game meat distribution from the PAM to the human communities on the protected area's
periphery.

fib. Endogenous Human Demand for and
Poaching of Wildlife Meat
The best available data suggest meat comprises approximately 14% of food expenditures,
or about 11% of total household expenditures, among rural Tanzanians generally [22], implying
per capita meat expenditures of about Tshl,040 (roughly US$5) per year in the Serengeti region.
Assume Y4 of a Serengeti household's meat consumption comes from game, perhaps a
conservative assumption given that meat from domestic stock is far more expensive. Then an
average household of seven persons that takes 60% of game meat in the form of wildebeest
consumes about 1/3 wildebeest per year, based on $ 16/carcass 1988 fresh game meat prices

8
[6, 9, 10]. This implies about 60,000 wildebeest currently taken annually in the region, a figure
consistent with expert estimates based on discussions with villagers and studies of carcasses. At a
metabolic weight4 of 53 kg, a crude estimate of annual slaughtered wildebeest meat supply in the
local Serengeti economy is 3.2 million kilograms. Game meat consumption is substantial and
poaching represents an important activity for peripheral communities.
While the population dynamics of the wildebeest is reasonably well understood, little is
known about the nature and dynamics of human demand for wildlife. This section is therefore
speculative. We model human demand for and poaching of wildlife using the best of the very
limited available evidence on the appropriate parameters, but our results are merely suggestive,
not proper "empirical" findings. At a minimum, this section and the next should illustrate the
pressing need for careful empirical research to estimate the appropriate human behavioral
parameters more precisely. To date, studies of wildlife harvest invariably assume exogenous and
static demand and labor patterns. This section points toward a more realistic and informative
approach to modeling game meat consumption and poaching behavior but one that demands more
empirical research for its validation.
Following closely DeJanvry et al. 's [7] seminal work on nonseparable household
modeling, we posit a representative Serengeti region household that allocates its labor and land
between two different activities, sedentarized food production and poaching, so as to maximize
the utility it derives from the consumption of several different goods and of leisure time. Our
model captures the essence of the decisions made by agriculturalists operating in an environment

4 "Metabolic " weight refers to the mass of muscle, organs, and blood and is, thus, closer to the weight of the
meat than the animal's gross weight, including bone, skin, and stomach.
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of stochastic production and significant market failures. This permits us to study the nature and
time path of human behaviors associated with both poaching and game meat consumption among
the human communities on the Serengeti's perimeter.
The household produces (qi

~

0) traditional foods (crops and domestic livestock, i = f) and

game meat (i = g) using two factors (qi

~

0): land (i = t) and labor (i = I). The household

possesses a production technology J(q;w) that relates factors and products, conditional on the
weather and other environmental conditions (w) that are fully known to the household but may
vary from year to year. 5 The household has an endowment (ei ~ 0) of each commodity. The
household maximizes the utility it derives from the consumption (cJ of traditional foods (i = f),
game meat (i = g), nonfood household goods (i = h), and leisure (i = I), given household size (n),
and subject to a cash budget constraint that includes both proceeds from its own activities and
transfers from outside (s). Perfectly competitive markets exist for traditional foods and nonfood
household goods, so the household buy and sells
those products freely at a given price. These are
r
hereafter referred to as tradable commodities (the set T = {f,h}). No markets exist for game
meat, labor (leisure), or land; the household must fully self-provision in these factors and
products. 6 These commodities are thus labelled nontradables (the set NT = {g, I, t}).
Given these characteristics, the household solves the following problem:

5For purposes of tractability, we employ a simple static model under certainty. An interesting extension would
be a more general, stochastic dynamic formulation that recognizes intertemporal demand patterns and the effect of
stochastic technology on consumption and production patterns.

60ne can perhaps best understand the absence of markets in this representative household model as capturing
the autarkic nature of the village economy in these commodities. While there is clearly some trade in labor, land, and
meat among households within Serengeti villages, there seems to be far less intervillage trade. Moreover, agricultural
households in the region surely do not face perfectly elastic demand or supply schedules for these commodities, hence,
the simplifying assumption of complete markets failure.
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max
c,q

U(c;n)

s.t.

~iETPi

(7a)

(qi + ei -

q.1 + e·1 - c·1
J(q;w)

~

cJ + s ~ 0

0 ViENT

=0

tradables' cash budget constraint

(7b)

nontradables' availability constraint

(7c)

production technology constraint

(7d)

The constraints (7b-7 d) represent the production technologies and market conditions prevailing in
the region, which are presumed static. The Lagrangean associated with this constrained
optimization problem thus takes the form:

Note that nontradables' prices are endogenous in this problem, with Pi* = J,1/1 ViENT, while
tradables' prices are exogenous by assumption, Pi * = Pi Vi ET. Assuming an interior solution, 7 the
first-order necessary conditions for an optimum can be written as:

u· =
1

lp·*
1

<l>Ji = -lpi*
~ Pi ci =

L Pi (q i +eJ + s

ci = qi + ei

VCi

(9a)

Vqi

(9b)

iET

(9c)

Vi ENT

(9d)
(ge)

J(q,w) = 0
Algebraic manipulation of equations (9) produces a generalized profit function,
1t*(p*,w) =

~Pi*qi'

a system of input demand and output supply equations, q*

=

q(p*,w), a

7Equivalently, assuming U(-) is strictly increasing in its argwnents. This asswnes that the income elasticity of
demand for game meat is positive. While it is probably true that game meat becomes an inferior good as people become
sufficiently wealthy (and substitute beeffor game), for the context we examine, the current generation of a very poor
population, this asswnption is reasonably innocuous.
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function defining full income, y* = 1t * + ~ Pi *ei + s, and a system of demand equations,
c* = c(p* ,y*).
The key feature of this model of household behavior is that the price of game meat and the
wage rate for labor are both endogenous, which induces households to reallocate their time
between labor on the farm, poaching, and leisure. These endogenous prices are a function, in
part, of agricultural productivity, which is subject to external shocks. In years with adverse
production conditions, the marginal product of agricultural labor declines and the marginal
opportunity cost of leisure increases, making poaching relatively more attractive. This feature of
the model captures the propensity of peasants to poach as a survival strategy in the face of crop
failure.
Endogenous prices and wages are also a function of endowments (including meat quotas
received from SRCS) that partly or fully satisfy demand for game meat or leisure. Note that in
order to prevent poaching completely, SRCS must provide game meat such that eg = cg . This
relaxes constraint (7 c), reducing its associated multiplier, Jl g , thereby driving Pg * (and the
marginal returns to poaching) to zero. At the same time, y* increases with eg , stimulating game
meat consumption through both income and substitution effects. This basic point is too often
overlooked in ICDP design. P AMs often recognize that carcass distribution from managed culls
can reduce or eliminate poaching, but they typically fail to note that it simultaneously stimulates
game meat consumption. This plants the seed of the mechanism's destruction, which occurs
faster the more income and price elastic is the demand for game meat. There may be sound
biological reasons for managed harvests if these are less harmful to the species' population
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dynamics than an identical volume of poaching.8 But managed harvests for distribution to human
populations that would otherwise poach necessarily increase offtake volumes.9
Moreover, note that the eg necessary to induce peasants to quit poaching is endogenous,
depending upon the realization of environmental shocks, w, to agricultural production. Even if
the PAM can accurately elicit local households' willingness to accept (WTA) value for poaching
the first year-the eg value that yields qg = 0 conditional on known w-that amount will change
each successive year with probability one. Where game poaching and consumption behaviors are
endogenous, the PAM must be prepared either to renegotiate the ICDP contract or to observe
poaching virtually every period.
The effects are only slightly different if the P AM provides income transfers in another
form, i.e., the ICDP contributes to s rather than to eg . Then the transfer again produces positive
income effects on cg , but now the substitution effects are negative because cash transfers reduce
A. The net effects on game meat consumption are ambiguous, but the returns to poaching are

increased by raising the relative price (Pg *) of game meat. The more fungible the asset
transferred, the less will the effects of the transfer concentrate on game meat demand, but
poaching could well increase. While the results of this model relate specifically to ICDPs based
on game cropping, we see no reason to expect other sorts of transfers to yield qualitatively better
results.

80ur model does not capture these prospective differences.
~ote that this result follows automatically from the assumptions that game meat is (1) nontradable
(cg = eg + <lg), and (2) a normal good (ac/iJeg > 0). Combine these and simple calculus and algebra reveals that
aq/aeg > -1, i.e., there is less than a one-for-one tradeoff ofPAM-distributed meat for poached game.
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We need to specify particular functional forms to operationalize this model. A
parsimonious specification makes sense given the dearth of empirical information on the
behavioral patterns of peasant agriculturalists in the Serengeti region. Like Barnum and Squire
[2], we employ a Stone-Geary utility function to economize on parameters and to explicitly
incorporate subsistence needs. The specific model for (7a) is thus:
C. - k. )
U(c;n) - Tllj ( ~

~

(10)

for j-f,g,h,l

where l' and the ~'s are positive constants, with the ~'s representing subsistence minima. We set
kf at Y2 kg/household per day of maize, the staple food in the region, kh -representing medicines,
cooking fuel, building materials, tools, etc.-at 40% the expenditure level of kf' kl at 5% of
household labor time, and kg =

o.

Without loss of generality, let Lj 6j

=

1 and 6j

~

0 \fj. Based on

household expenditure data [22], we set 6f = 0.5, 6g = 0.15, and 6 h = 0.3.
Similar concerns for parsimony motivate a Cobb-Douglas specification of technologies:
(11)
(12)

where ql = qlf+ qlg'

Z

is an N(O,Q) exogenous shock to agricultural yields that is independent

from v, the N(O,~) rainfall shock from section ITa, and p is the correlation coefficient between
these shocks. Simulations in section ITI proceed on the assumption that v and z are serially
independent and identically distributed. We set

n so as to maintain a constant variance of qf,

equal to observed variability in yields for maize, the dominant crop in the region, over the past
twenty years [20]. Since it is unclear how poaching yields vary with rainfall, qg is modeled as a
deterministic function of qlg. We assume decreasing returns to labor in both agriculture and
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poaching as well as constant returns to scale in agricultural production (0 < Yi < 1 for i = 1, 2, 3,
and Y2 + Y3 = 1), with Y1 = 0.9 and Y2 = 0.8. The production function constants, bf and bg , were
set at 10 and 1, respectively, so as to calibrate local maize output and game offiake volumes at
w = 0 to the best estimates of current levels. Finally, mean land per rural Tanzanian household is
4.7 hectares [20], so et = -qtf= 4.7.
Average household size in the Serengeti region was n = 7.03 persons in 1988 [6]. Using a
conselVative estimate of 1.25 million persons in proximity to the park in 1995, we use a base of

hho = 177,800 households.

Let I = n, i.e., all household members are available to work. We

assume that human populations in the Serengeti continue to grow at the long-term rate, based on
1957-88 census data, of2.9% per year [16], with growth arising through increased numbers of
households, i.e.,

~+1

=

1.029~.

Section ITa deferred definition of the halVest volume,
define gross game meat demand as D t = cg t

~

~,

to this section. Let us now

= (egt + qg t)~. Data on animals killed by

poachers indicates that wildebeest comprise about 60% of poaching volumes, by either number or
metabolic weight, making them by far the largest target species in the Serengeti [1]. We thus
assume a constant 60% proportion of poaching (qg), game meat consumption (cg), and SRCS
meat distribution (eg ) are wildebeest. Our decision rule is thus that as long as O. 6Dt s

~ *,

i.e.,

as long as human demand does not threaten the sustainability of the wildebeest herd, then the
PAM will honor the quasi-contract and deliver 0.6egt , so that 0.6 D t = ~. The biologically,
politically, and socially perilous point we define as crisis arrives, however, when O. 6Dt > H t*. The
next section presents simulations of how long until the PAM faces crisis in managing the ICDP.
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ill. Simulations of Time to Crisis
We generated an empirical distribution of the time to crisis by replicated simulations of
the model in section II. In each period of each simulation, we randomly drew with replacement
the three exogenous variables (u, v, z) from their specified distributions and the a,

P parameters

from PH's [13] published joint distribution. Based on these realizations of the time-varying
exogenous variables, we solve the household's constrained optimization problem, computed the
wildebeest population size, and determined whether 0.6 D t > ~*. If not, we let N and hh grow
according to the laws of motion specified in section II, then began the next period by resampling
u, v, z, a, and

p. Each simulation was replicated 300 times. We repeated this process 27 times,

to account for alternative assumptions about: (1) the correlation between shocks to rainfall and to
agricultural productivity (p), (2) the contractual volume of wildebeest meat given each household
by the PAM (eg ), and (3) the endogenous rate of human population growth (m). Table 1 reports
the median and standard deviation of these empirical distributions, as measured in years. 10
In each of the 27 scenarios, the median simulated time to crisis is fairly short, between 9

and 14 years. Among the 8,100 simulations, the minimum time to crisis was 2 years, the
maximum 58. ,Note also the relatively small standard deviations in Table 1, which range only
between 2.9 and 4.1 years. If our parameterization of household behaviors is anywhere near
accurate, there seems strong reason to suspect that ICDPs with a substantial game cropping
component are likely to collapse in 6-18 years.

10Any simulation makes a multitude of assumptions which are impossible to validate. Still, it is good practice
to ensure that one's model would not predict a history other than that which has been observed. Toward this end we
simulated this model 20 times from a 1980 base. None of these simulations yielded collapse prior to 1995, so it does not
seem our parameterization strongly biases simulation results in favor of early collapse.
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The concentrated period of likely ICDP collapse is highlighted graphically in Figure 1,
which portrays the effects of the sensitivity analysis performed with respect to eg , m, and p. In
our best case scenario, corresponding to the upper leftmost cell in Table la (eg = 0.33, m = 0,
p = 0.3), the PAM has a 0.5 probability offacing crisis within 14 years and a 0.1 probability of
facing crisis within 10 years. An intermediate scenario, the central cell from Table Ib (eg = 0.5,
m = 0.005, p = 0.5) shows a cumulative frequency distribution lying entirely to the left of the best
case scenario distribution, with a 10% chance of crisis within 6 years and a 50% chance of crisis
within 10 years. The most alarming situation follows from our worst case scenario,
corresponding to the lower rightmost cell in Table lc (eg = 1.0, m = 0.01, p

= 0.7). If these

parameters are accurate, then the 0.1 and 0.5 probability levels for time to crisis are at only 5 and
8 years, respectively.
Note from Table 1 that the median time to crisis changes quite symmetrically as one varies
any of the three parameter values (eg , m, or p). These may be merely modeling artifacts, and,
without strong empirical underpinnings to the human behavioral model, we cannot say much
about the relative magnitudes of these effects. Nonetheless, we believe this reflects primarily
initial proximity to the biologically maximal harvests predicted by PH. Almost any increase in
total offiake, no matter the reason, thus leads to collapse in a short number of years.
One can see this most clearly by looking at a plot of a representative simulation. Figure 2
displays the time path of both human demand,
~ *,

~,

and the maximum noncatastrophic harvest,

for one base case simulation (eg = 0.33, m = 0, p = 0.3) that yielded crisis at the median time

of 14 years. Plotted along with those time series is the weighted least squares regression line of
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~ on time, representing the linear time trend in human game meat demand. I I Notice that crisis

occurs when the wildebeest population suffers a severe negative shock, bringing the herd size
down to the region where secular growth in or a shock to human demand for game meat can
induce crisis.
Consider Figures 3a, 3b, and 3c, which overlay the fitted values

of~

under alternative

parameter value assumptions. In Figure 3a, we compare the base case with a scenario of high
game meat distribution (eg = 1.00, m = 0, and p = 0.3), increasing the intercept to account for a
greater initial income effect on game meat demand and, thereby, shifting the whole regression line
upwards, leading to earlier crises. Positive endogenous effects on human population growth
change not the intercept of the regression line, but its slope does change. Thus, in Figure 3b, with
m = 0.01 (and eg = 0.33, and p = 0.3), more rapid human population growth induces steeper
increases in game meat demand and earlier crises than under the base case. Finally, an increase in
the correlation of environmental shocks affects not the intercept or slope of the regression line so
much as the variability of the estimator. Thus, in Figure 3c, when we let p = 0.7 (with eg = 0.33
and m = 0), there is very little change in the regression line from the base case, but the 90%
confidence band around the regression line widens noticeably. This reflects the higher probability
of a common environmental shock causing human demand to increase and intersect earlier with
the maxmimum noncatastrophic wildebeest harvest. The three parameters we vary in the
simulations thus impact in different ways on human demand for game meat, but the end results, as

11 These are the fitted values from the weighted least squares regression, w t ~ ~ = w t ~ t + ~, where the w t are
the inverse of the cumulative frequencies depicted in Figme 1 and the et are iid nonnal residuals. These regressions
were estimated on the 300 replicates generated for the relevant simulation (in this case with eg = 0.33, m = 0.00 and
p = 0.3).
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depicted in Table 1, are strikingly similar. Variation in anyone of the parameters brings human
demand into a threatening range earlier than under the base case.

rna. Alternative Environmental Stochasticity
Correlations
PH's simulations using the model of section ITa suggest that the probability of population
collapse increases exponentially with annual harvest volume, exceeding 20% (over a 200-year
timeframe) once total harvest reaches 50,000 or more wildebeest, a figure well below estimated
current offiake levels. They note that constant harvest rate regimes produce far lower probability
of herd collapse than constant harvest volume regimes producing the same average catch. PH
find that the expected harvest increases rapidly with higher rainfall because of a higher recruitment
rate in the herd.
Like most existing studies of harvest or poaching patterns, PH ignore human demand
patterns. Once one accommodates endogenous human poaching and meat consumption, the
positive relationship between harvest and rainfall may break down, rendering constant harvest rate
regimes socially infeasible. This is because poaching is an important form of income insurance in
the event of crop failure. The stronger the correlation between rainfall and agricultural
productivity, the more amazing is the "insurance" activity of poaching because covariate shocks
to the wildebeest herd and crop yields induce greater human dependence on wildlife just as the
herd can least withstand increased harvest.
The adverse effect of covariate environmental stochasticity on ICDPs' durability is
reflected in Table 1. Holding eg and m constant (i.e., reading down the columns in each of the
three panels in Table 1), median time to crisis consistently declines as p increases. Because
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poaching becomes relatively attractive when external shocks (e.g., drought) depress labor
productivity, covariate shocks that depress both food availability for wildebeest and agricultural
labor productivity will almost inevitably increase harvest rates. A constant harvest rate strategy is
likely futile in such a setting, because it is unlikely to satisfy local game meat demand and so will
not have its intended effect of curtailing illegal hunting.
The positive relationship between the relative returns to poaching and the correlation of
environmental shocks and agricultural yields highlights the importance, from a conservation
biology perspective, of agricultural research and extension to improve drought resistance among
crops and animal epidemiological control among livestock. Agricultural development specialists
and conservation biologists concerned about environments like the Serengeti have shared
objectives in this area.

Illb. Alternative Managed Harvest Meat
Distribution Volumes
We set the baseline value for eg to V3 wildebeest per household per year, i.e., the current
estimated consumption/poaching volume, and in the range of original legal harvest plans, which
are presently not being met due to donor funding cuts. This is shown in the first column of each
of the three panels in Table 1. Given the broad range of estimates for game meat consumption
volumes, it could be argued that a higher distribution rate of Y2 to 1 wildebeestlhousehold per year
may be necessary to curtail poaching. We simulate the model under each of these scenarios.
A higher offtake volume, eg , does diminish poaching rates, although poaching remains
common given a static distribution volume (i.e., no renegotiation of contractual compensation
under the ICDP). The percentage of periods in which qg = 0 was 11.1% with eg = 0.33, almost all
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in the initial periods of the simulations. This figure increased to 17.3% when eg = 0.5 and to
28.8% when eg = 1.0. Notice there is a positive level of poaching activity most periods, because
the transfer level is constant over time while demand for game meat and the relative returns to
alternative activities change over time. This illustrates the point made in section IIb, that the eg
necessary to induce peasants to stop poaching is endogenous and thus variable over time.
While a higher distribution rate, eg , discourages poaching, it simultaneously stimulates
game meat consumption due to income and substitution effects, thereby hastening the time to
crisis in ICDPs. Holding m and p constant (i.e., reading across the rows in each of the three
panels of Table 1), median time to crisis consistently falls as eg rises. The qualitative effects of
increasing game meat distributions are thus the same as those from increased correlation of
environmental stochasticity between wildebeest survival and recruitment rates and agricultural
production, as highlighted earlier. The important difference is that while the PAM has only
limited, long-term, indirect influence over p (through support for agricultural research and
extension in the area), slhe has direct control over eg . Our results suggest smaller distributions of
game meat help preserve the herd, even though they might not reduce poaching.

me.

Endogenous Human Population Growth
Rates
Up to this point we have assumed the introduction of an ICDP providing income transfers

to the local population has no effect on the rate of human population growth. This is a
conservative assumption. Population growth rates in the Serengeti region are historically
somewhat lower than in the rest of Tanzania (and in neighboring Kenya). We suspect this is
largely attributable to greater rates of out-migration, lower rates of in-migration, and higher
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mortality rates owing to the region's relatively more widespread and severe poverty. Amelioration of such differences and improved nutrition from more reliable availability of calorie and
protein sources such as game meat would likely increase the human population growth rate in the
reasonably near-term which we study.12 We now generalize the earlier formulation of growth to
~+1

= (1.029 + m)~, where m is the endogenous component of the local human population

growth rate. The baseline simulations discussed in section II and presented in Table la implicitly
set m = o. We resimulated the model under two less conservative estimates, m = 0.005 and
m = 0.01, corresponding to local human population growth rates of3.4% and 3.9%, respectively.
It should be obvious that the greater the human population base drawing on the wildebeest

herd for food and income, the larger the harvests. Thus, more rapid human population growth
inevitably leads to greater pressure on the ecosystem and earlier collapse of the ICDP. This can
be seen in the declining median time to crisis as m increases, holding eg and p constant (i.e., as
one looks down the three panels in Table 1). Of course, we have modeled all population growth
as coming in the form of new households. These effects might be muted somewhat if a large part
of human population growth came instead from expanding average household size, although the
limited available evidence suggests that most population growth in the region in the past
generation has come from increased numbers of households rather than more people in
households [6, 22].

12Long-term declines in human fertility rates associated with improved standards of living far exceed the time
horizons of interest here.
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IV. Discussion
We have relied heavily on PHs [13] model of wildebeest population dynamics. PH
estimate the probability of population collapse under different harvest regimes, implicitly assuming
human demand and poaching patterns are completely controllable by protected area managers.
We extend PHs work by explicitly modeling endogenous human behavior, following the
nonseparable agricultural household modeling technique introduced by DeJanvry et al. [7]. In
particular, we study how long ICDPs might reasonably be expected to serve as a palliative in the
longer term struggle to refocus attention and resources on parallel processes of rural
development, poverty alleviation and wildlife conservation.
Our model enormously simplifies the interaction within the Serengeti ecosystem of
wildebeest population dynamics with patterns of human demand for and poaching of game meat,
each of which is likely to be complex in its own right. Yet this model captures some key features
of this poorly understood interaction. Wildlife poaching is a source of food and income for
extremely poor human populations subject to considerable risk of nutritional catastrophe.
Although we emphasize that our parameterization of human demand patterns are merely
guesses-and that the vacuum of careful social science research on the etiology of human impacts
on wildlife populations must be made a research priority-our simulations suggest that African
wildlife ICDPs, with a significant game cropping component, are unlikely to survive long in their
present design.
Note that we have used optimistic assumptions in this simulation: e.g., that wildebeest
harvests do not exceed historical proportions (60%) of poaching or game meat demand, that the
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human population base for game meat demand is purely 10cal13 and that there will be no
recurrence of prolonged dry season drought like that experienced in the Serengeti in the 1960s.
Our sense is thus that the simulation results presented above are as likely to overstate as to
understate the risk of near-term collapse for African wildlife ICDPs that are substantially
dependent on transfers to the local population.
As the discussion in section lIb emphasized, the seemingly static nature of agricultural

production technologies and market conditions in the face of growing human populations are the
crux of the threat to protected species. Poaching levels are a function of the maximum alternative
returns to a peasant's labor and on household income. African farmers respond rationally to
climatic or epidemiological shocks that depress the productivity of farm work [8]. When there
are few, if any, alternative sources of food and income, locals rationally prey on protected wildlife
species. Given that the wildebeest population varies directly with rainfall, the more covariate the
environmental shocks to wildlife populations and agricultural yields, the greater the poaching
pressure on the herd at precisely the moment it can least ably sustain added harvest. We suggest,
therefore, that obviating such pressures must be a high priority in conservation strategies.
Obvious but challenging avenues for doing so include agricultural research that improves pest
control and drought resistance for crops and epidemiological control for domestic livestock, and
the activation of rural labor markets that might provide a competitive wage floor on the returns to

13There have long been unconfirmed reports that poached game meat is trucked out of the area to urban centers
like Kisumu, Musoma, Mwanza, and even Nairobi. If this is true, then the consumer population is much larger, perhaps
by an order of magnitude. If communications and transportation infrastructure development in the area continues, the
effective market for game meat will surely grow rapidly. Note that a far larger spatial market would also invalidate the
assumed nontradability of game meat, which would tend to exacerbate the problem of poaching in response to crop
failure, since game meat sales could be used to finance traditional food purchases, thus, stimulating even more poaching
than occurs in our model.
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labor time, thereby rendering poaching an inferior activity.I4 Reducing the returns or increasing
the risks to poaching through fortified enforcement efforts, as SRCS plans to do, likewise
discourages peasant reallocation of labor time to poaching, although it fails to decouple rural
livelihoods from poaching. IS Covariate environmental risks inevitably pit P AMs against local
populations as long as wages are endogenous.
Growth in human demand for game meat, attributable to both income and human
population growth, poses a long-run threat to the wildebeest and other wildlife populations slated
for harvest as part of an ICDP. Insofar as ICDPs provide an income transfer to locals and, thus,
induce in-migration, they may further hasten their own collapse. Moreover, as communications
and transport improve in the region, reducing marketing costs and expanding the spatial market
for wildlife products, game meat will from the nontradable good category modelled here to the set
of tradables. Then meat distribution from managed harvests will cease to reduce the returns to
poaching. Game cropping will still become a less effective means to reduce poaching, and each
may continue to stimulate game meat consumption.
Finally, it is important to note that in principle ICDPs are supposed to foster cooperative
efforts between parks staff and local populations and that observed instances of success in ICDPs
so far correlate closely with strong cooperation among all parties to the quasi-contracts [5, 21].
Our model, however, is one of myopic, self-interested behavior that ignores the possibility of
cooperative action. However, we do not mean to imply that the human communities around the

14Bluffstone [4] analogously finds that a competitive labor market offering a known. even if low. off-fann wage
rate can obviate deforestation problems even under open access.
150ur model assumes constant enforcement effort and certain returns to poaching. A useful extension would
generalize these characteristics.
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Serengeti or other large reselVes are incapable of cooperation and self-policing. Instead, our
concern is that cooperative strategies may not be viable given the region's severe poverty and the
imperfect abilities of authorities to monitor illegal halVests. For example how do village leaders
ensure that young men suffering poverty-induced undernutrition do not set line snares to poach
migratory ungulates while they tend livestock out of view of the village? This is a serious
challenge in the design of enforceable contracts between parks officials, community leaders, and
community members.
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Table 1: Simulation Descriptive Statistics
Table 1a: Human Population Growth = 2.9% (m = 0)
Median (std dey)

eg = 0.33

eg = 0.50

p =0.3

14 (3.4)

12 (3.3)

11 (3.6)

p =0.5

12 (3.7)

11 (3.5)

10 (3.5)

p =0.7

11 (3.5)

10 (4.1)

9 (2.9)

Table 1b: Human Population Growth = 3.4% (m = 0.005)
Median (std dey)

eg = 0.33

p =0.3

12 (3.6)

11 (3.2)

10 (3.3)

p =0.5

11 (3.8)

10 (3.4)

9 (3.3)

p =0.7

10 (3.3)

9 (3.0)

9 (3.0)

Table 1c: Human Population Growth = 3.9% (m = 0.01)
Median (std dey)

eg = 0.33

eg = 0.50

p =0.3

11 (3.3)

10 (3.3)

9 (3.4)

p =0.5

10 (3.4)

9 (3.4)

9 (3.4)

p =0.7

9 (3.0)

9 (3.2)

9 (3.0)
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Time To Crisis Under Three Scenarios
Cumulative Frequency Distributions
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Figure 1. . Graphical depiction of time to crisis distributions
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Figure 3a. Fitted harvest volumes with eg = 1.0
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Figure 3e. Fitted harvest volumes with p=O.7

